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The unique and idiosyncratic project of governance of the Energy Union is mainly a response to the 
2030 renewables and energy efficiency targets which are not nationally binding. In this way, the new 
proposed governance model resembles the design of the Paris Agreement mechanisms to some degree. 
A divergence with the Paris Agreement is that the Energy Union governance model does not foresee 
any ratcheting up of targets. The EU’s long-standing experience in monitoring and accounting of 
greenhouse gas emissions – both its Union-wide target and national targets has been helpful. 
However, despite some clear corrective measures for the greenhouse gas emissions target, many of the 
Commission’s tools to address gaps remain in the realm of soft governance. More clarity is needed 
regarding some aspects of the Commission’s proposal. And a weakening of the proposed governance 
system may come mainly in the shape of member states pushing back on timing 
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transmission system operators. 
  1 
Introduction* 
On November 30, 2016, the European Commission’s Vice President for the Energy Union Šefčovič 
and Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Cañete presented a long-awaited and extensive 
package of legislative and non-legislative proposals, the so-called ‘Winter Package’ – or in full, the 
‘Clean Energy for All Europeans Package’. Weighing in at over one thousand pages, this package 
checked the box of making 2016 ‘the year of delivery’ for the Energy Union.  
In our paper, we will focus on one part of this sizeable package, namely the proposal on 
governance of the Energy Union. Governance is the major novelty element in the Commission’s 
Winter Package, and it has certainly become a particularly relevant issue in light of recent policy 
developments, including the Energy Union policy, the transition from the EU’s 2020 energy and 
climate targets to the 2030 goals, and the Paris process under the UNFCCC (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change) track.  
The Energy Union concept, born in 2014-2015, represents an attempt to move beyond the ‘silo 
thinking’ the EU has up to now been renowned for in its energy policy. In integrating five different 
dimensions – security of supply, a fully integrated internal energy market, energy efficiency, 
decarbonization, and research and innovation – into one strategy, the need was created (or perhaps 
simply cast in a starker light) for improved coordination between policy instruments, measures and 
levels of government.  
The 2030 Climate and Energy Framework has also presented new challenges in governance. One 
of the chief novelties in the 2030 targets, which were approved in 2014, is that there are no longer 
binding renewables targets for every member state (i.e. member states are no longer bound to 
achieving a particular target share of renewables in the total energy consumption), as was the case in 
the 2020 strategy. Rather, the renewables target has become binding at the Union level only. In order, 
then, to reach the Union-wide objective of generating at least 27% of total energy consumption by 
renewables without binding targets at member state level, there is a need for a governance system to 
safeguard ambition and delivery. The second 2030 target, on energy efficiency, is currently only 
indicative and applies at EU level solely,
1
 and therefore also requires an advanced system of 
governance. 
Finally, in December 2015, the EU signed the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC. With the EU’s 
ratification of the Agreement in October 2016, the Union and its member states have agreed to comply 
with the ‘ratcheting up’ mechanism of the Agreement, which involves a number of reporting 
requirements and commitments. Here again, governance will be needed to ensure compliance with the 
Agreement (although the EU already has rich experience in monitoring and accounting in greenhouse 
gas emissions, developed throughout its participation in the Kyoto Protocol), but especially to 
safeguard credibility – through delivery – if the EU is to maintain the significant role it values in 
international climate change process and negotiations. It is interesting to note, in addition, that a 
number of the reiterative reporting and monitoring provisions of the governance part of the Winter 
Package bear formal resemblance to the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement. 
In sum, in order to make the Energy Union, the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework, and the Paris 
Agreement operational, there is a need for governance at the EU level. It is the aim of this paper to 
                                                     
*
 This paper was developed with the financial support of Gas Natural Fenosa, under the umbrella of the Gas Natural 
Fenosa-ESADE Chair in the Geopolitics of Energy. All content, views and positions in this paper are the sole 
responsibility of its authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of Fundación ESADE, the EUI, or any of their 
funders. 
1
 However, the Winter Package proposes – in its proposed revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive (European 
Commission, 2016g) – to shift this target to a binding Union-level target and to increase ambition. 
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examine the governance proposal the Commission has put forward, as well as the processes it 
contains.  
The central questions this paper aims to answer are: What is the proposed governance system for 
the Energy Union? How does the proposed system attempt to connect Union-level energy and climate 
targets with voluntary, national-level planning and execution? What political and energy context was 
this proposal born in and how are these circumstances reflected in the legislative text? And finally, 
which political issues are likely to arise as this proposal is studied by various EU bodies throughout 
the legislative process?  
We find that the proposed governance regulation is quite elegant as an interactive institutional 
footbridge, but questions remain over the effectiveness of some of its provisions. We also point to the 
issues and preferences the member states will likely struggle over during the upcoming legislative 
process. The political debate over the Energy Union’s governance will not, however, be independent 
of discussions on other parts of this large and complex package.  
1. The Birth of the Energy Union  
The EU’s Energy Union strategy is the latest installment in the Union’s energy policy. While the 
European Union itself partially finds its origins in two international organizations working on energy-
specific topics (the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom), energy policy was in fact slow 
to develop at the EU level. A number of moments might have led to more policy impetus: the 1973 oil 
crisis, for example, provided a wakeup call on the need for cooperation for many European states, but 
it did not convince key players such as France. Subsequently, the US-led creation of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and its establishment of oil stocks underlined how little progress had been made 
in Brussels once again. Although a resolution expressing the need for addressing energy supply and 
demand was passed in 1974, it did not lead to any significant practice.  
By the late 1980s, the market-based only approach of the then-European Community, blessed by 
the Single Act promising a single EU internal market with no seams, started to be reflected in energy, 
through a Commission (1988) working paper on the internal energy market. The 1990s, however, 
provided another lull in energy-policy making. Member states relaxed in the face of a favorable energy 
supply situation of low oil prices, and the “end of history” moment (Fukuyama, 1998) pushed 
Europeans and former communist countries to adopt the investment-protecting Energy Charter Treaty 
(1994) which aimed at expanding the EU internal market-based approach in the Union’s 
neighborhood. Finally, by the late 1990s, the European Commission formally embarked on its path of 
market liberalization and integration for energy, which it has continued until today.  
The European Commission proposed, in a series of waves, three energy legislative packages (1996, 
2003 and 2009). The first wave was one of soft market integration, establishing fora and platforms for 
European energy regulators and ministries to cooperate and coordinate. The second wave was 
somewhat stronger, and required all member states to create independent national regulatory 
authorities to regulate access to the energy markets that were slowly being built. It also stipulated that 
power and gas markets were to be fully open by mid-2007. By early 2007, the Commission concluded 
that integration towards that European market had not progressed as intended, and the third wave, 
which kicked off that same year, therefore strengthened European-level coordination, establishing the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and creating two more European bodies: 
the Networks of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs) for gas (ENTSO-G) and electricity 
(ENTSO-E). It also imposed a minimal ‘unbundling’ of supply and transmission operations to further 
market liberalization.  
Before continuing, it is important to touch on the rupture occurring with the Lisbon Treaty. Before 
Lisbon (December 2007), energy did not feature in any of the EU’s treaties except for the Coal and 
Steel Community (1952-2002) and the Euratom Treaty (1957); or as trans-European networks in the 
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1992 Maastricht Treaty. In the Lisbon Treaty, it was stated that Union policy on energy would aim 
(“in the spirit of solidarity between member states”) to “(a) ensure the functioning of the energy 
market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy 
saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the 
interconnection of energy networks.” [TFEU Art. 194]. However, it very importantly warned that 
Member States have strong rights in energy: “Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to 
determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply.” [Art. 194(2)]. Member states thus retained full 
sovereignty over their energy mixes (Delbeke, Klaassen & Vergote, 2015, p.62).  
The EU subsequently presented its ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’, which included a package of measures 
on energy and climate change that confirmed three binding targets (set by the Council in March 2007 
and 2008 and voted in Parliament in December 2008) for member states by 2020:  
 reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% (relative to 1990 levels);
2 
 
 increasing the share of final energy consumption from renewable sources to 20%; and  
 improving energy efficiency by 20% (relative to projected energy use levels for 2020). 
In 2011, the Commission took a much longer-term view, publishing, based on European Council 
requests, a Communication called A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 
2050 (European Commission, 2011). This roadmap provided some guidance on a far more ambitious 
target, namely the EU objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared 
to 1990 levels. 
For the 2020 targets, the EU’s progress is monitored using two different tools. With regard to the 
adoption of renewable energy sources (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 
2009b) and energy efficiency increase (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2012), 
the key instrument is the European Semester. Created as a response to the Eurocrisis in 2010, the 
European Semester is the annual cycle of macro-economic, budgetary and structural policy 
coordination between the Commission and the Member States. The yearly assessment is based on the 
Member States submitting their National Reform Programs (NRPs) and the Commission reacting to 
these by producing Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs). Importantly, the European Semester 
goes far beyond energy-related policies and is the main macro-economic monitoring tool in the hands 
of the Commission. It covers country public and private debts, fiscal deficits and unemployment, 
among other issues. 
With regard to emissions (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2009a), all EU 
countries are required to monitor their emissions under the EU's Greenhouse Gas Monitoring 
Mechanism, which sets the EU's own internal reporting rules. The national reporting in this 
mechanism covers, among others: emissions, projections and policies to cut greenhouse emissions, 
national measures to adapt to climate change, support for developing countries related to emissions 
reductions, and national governments' use of revenues from the auctioning of allowances in the EU 
emissions trading system.
3
 Importantly, while the European Semester is managed by the Vice 
Presidency for the Euro and Social Dialogue, it is DG Clima that manages the Greenhouse Gas 
Monitoring Mechanism. Finally, both the greenhouse gas emissions and renewables targets are 
                                                     
2
 Note that as per the European Council conclusions of March 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007), the EU was 
willing to raise its greenhouse gas emissions target to a 30% reduction relative to 1990 levels. It offered this provisional 
target as a carrot in the lead-up to the fateful COP-15 UNFCCC conference, in which it was hoped a global and 
comprehensive climate agreement would be signed. The 30% target was thus offered “provided that other developed 
countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries 
to contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.” 
3
 Under the emissions trading system, national governments have committed themselves to spend at least half of the 
system’s revenues on climate measures. 
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binding at the member state level in the 2020 framework, opening the door for Infringement 
Procedures if national targets are not met by 2020. 
According to the 2016 State of the Energy Union report (European Commission, 2017), the EU is 
in line to achieve the three 2020 targets: it currently stands at a 22% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions; 16% in energy produced by renewable resources;
4
 and in energy efficiency, the final energy 
consumption target has already been met, while primary consumption will still require some progress.  
At the beginning of 2014, the Commission proposed its new energy and climate targets for 2030, 
which the Council approved in October of the same year.
5
 The targets for 2030 are to: 
 reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% (relative to 1990);  
 increase the share of renewable energies in total final energy consumption to at least 27%; and 
 improve energy efficiency by at least 27% (as compared to a business-as-usual scenario).  
A strong difference with respect to the 2020 targets is that only the emissions reduction target is 
binding at the member-state level (Glachant, 2015, p.8). The renewables target is binding at the 
aggregate level (the EU level) only; while the energy efficiency target is merely indicative at EU and 
member state level. This new setting clearly sets a challenge for the overall governance of the 2030 
targets. 
As the 2030 targets were being set, the idea of an Energy Union emerged, rather unexpectedly, in 
the spring of 2014, when the crisis over Russia’s annexation of Crimea pushed energy concerns back 
to the top of the priority list, particularly for eastern EU member states. Donald Tusk, then Poland’s 
prime minister, called for an energy union in the face of the external threat that was Russia (one of 
Europe’s chief suppliers of gas, accounting for around 40% of imports at the time), and proposed that 
the EU could jointly negotiate its gas contracts with Russia (Tusk, 2014). This was particularly 
relevant for those eastern member states that import around 90% of their gas from Russia, such as 
Bulgaria and Slovakia. 
Tusk’s initial proposal was deeply modified, but the concept of an energy union was maintained as 
key by the incoming Juncker team, and finally published in the shape of a Commission 
communication on February 25, 2015, called A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with 
a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy.
6
 This strategy became the avenue the Juncker 
Commission chose to depart from the Barroso’s two Commissions, and to move beyond the 
consideration of various energy-related policies from separate angles (so-called ‘silo thinking’), while 
integrating certain climate and energy policies. 
Remarkably, the Juncker Commission strategy developed in a deeply Eurosceptic setting, with 
support for the European project in decline and political groups with centrifugal mindsets becoming 
more popular in multiple member states. Energy, however, was one issue area in which citizen support 
could be found for European policies (Keay & Buchan, 2015): recent Eurobarometers (European 
Commission, 2016k) have found that a steady 70% of European citizens support a common energy 
policy among EU member states. 
In energy, the Commission had, therefore, found a window to move forward – and moreover, 
progress on energy policy was necessary. The confluence of climate and energy policies has led to a 
fraught situation where the traditional liberalization agenda pursued by the Commission is in 
competition with a stark increase in national regulation and policy measures. Remarkably, these 
national regulations and policies were largely put in place in order to achieve a number of EU climate 
                                                     
4
 For a recent overview of progress on this target by individual member states, see Hassel, Nicolescu, Egenhofer, Nica & 
Elisei, 2017. 
5
 The European Parliament adopted a non-legislative resolution on the 2030 framework on February 5, 2014. 
6
 The strategy was endorsed by the European Council in March 2015. 
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change mitigation goals that required the implementation of specific technologies (such as renewables) 
(Glachant, 2016). Meanwhile, the instrument that was designed to leave to markets the task of welding 
together climate and energy policy– the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) – did not provide the 
robust market signals it was created for. With integration flagging, more action was needed to take off. 
The Juncker Commission stated that the overarching goal of the Energy Union would be to 
increase energy security, sustainability and competitiveness, by creating a “resilient Energy Union 
with an ambitious climate policy at its core”. This involved five main dimensions, which were meant 
to be integrated to achieve mutual reinforcement and close interrelations between them. These five 
dimensions are: (1) energy security, solidarity and trust; (2) a fully integrated European energy 
market; (3) energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand; (4) decarbonization of the 
economy; and (5) research, innovation and competitiveness. With a Pole at the head of the European 
Council (Donald Tusk), the vice presidency for the Energy Union was given to a Slovakian: Maroš 
Šefčovič. 2016 was announced as the ‘year of delivery’ for this policy.  
2. The Proposed Governance of the Energy Union 
On November 30, 2016, the European Commission published a new energy package in the context of 
its Energy Union strategy, formally titled ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’. It is a jumbo package, 
covering many policy areas from various angles, which introduces eight legislative proposals for 
revised or new regulations and directives and includes three approved eco-design regulations.
7
 It also 
contains one proposed change to the 2030 targets (which were originally decided in 2014): a shift to 
an EU binding energy efficiency target of 30% by 2030, from the original indicative Union-wide 
target of 27%.  
The proposals housed under this jumbo package can largely be divided into four overarching 
categories: electricity market and consumers; energy efficiency (including eco-design); renewables 
and bioenergy; and governance. The informally dubbed ‘Winter Package’ furthermore contains a host 
of other documents such as communications, impact assessments, reports on sector inquiries, and 
evaluations.  
Our paper will focus on the governance portion of the package, which consists of a proposed 
regulation, an impact assessment, and a fitness check of existing EU energy legislation. 
2.1 Goals 
The Commission explains that the overarching goal of the governance proposal is to ensure that 
“policies and measures at various levels are coherent, complementary and sufficiently ambitious” 
(European Commission, 2016j). More concretely, the proposed regulation aims to: 
 streamline and integrate existing planning, reporting and monitoring;
8
  
 start a political progress where member states and the Commission – with close involvement of 
other EU institutions – come together to work towards the Energy Union and 2030 targets and 
objectives; and  
 contribute to implementing the Paris Agreement.  
                                                     
7
 The three regulations cover: eco-design requirements for air heating and cooling products and chillers (European 
Commission, 2016c), tolerances in verification procedures for all eco-design measures (European Commission, 2016b), 
and tolerances in verification procedures for all energy labelling measures (European Commission, 2016a). 
8
 The proposal states that it “integrates, streamlines or repeals more than 50 existing individual planning, reporting and 
monitoring obligations of the energy and climate acquis (integrating 31 and deleting 23).” (European Commission, 2016j) 
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Additional goals include increasing transparency (both on the Union and the member states’ side) and 
improving investment certainty. 
In essence, the proposal aims to satisfy the divergent needs of the range of players in this process. 
For the Commission, the goal is to ensure that the ambition level and the coherence of the member 
states’ actions are sufficient to match the Energy Union and 2030 targets and objectives. For the 
member states, the governance proposal should provide flexibility, based on national specificities and 
preferences – although a number of member states might add another goal here, namely the same one 
as the Commission: to ensure the national actions add up to a high enough sum to reach Union-level 
goals. Another stated aim is to signal to market actors a degree of investment certainty and regulatory 
stability (European Commission, 2016f). 
The proposed regulation outlines an intricate system of planning, reporting and assessments. It 
describes: 
 the procedure and template to prepare national integrated energy and climate plans (NECPs) for 
2021-2030, as well as the iterative consultation process between the Commission and the 
member states to finalize the plans; 
 the biennial progress reports which member states are to submit on their progress towards the 
Energy Union’s goals and their NECPs, as well as other annual reporting requirements; 
 the monitoring and assessment that the Commission will carry out and a recommendations 
process flowing from it – both with regard to the NECPs and the progress reports; 
 requirements for reporting on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions inventories, policies, measures 
and projections, and for the preparation of member states’ long-term low emissions strategies 
with a 50 year perspective; and 
 the mechanisms necessary to implement this proposed regulation. 
The main building blocks are, on the one hand, the NECPs and the reporting and monitoring 
associated with them (especially via the biennial progress reports); and on the other, a set of specific 
reporting and monitoring provisions for greenhouse gas emissions inventories. 
2.2 National Energy and Climate Plans and the Iterative Process 
A) Key Elements and Years 
In a nutshell, the procedure is the following: once every ten years, member states prepare a draft 
national integrated energy and climate plan (NECP) according to a fixed template, stating their 
objectives and the policies to attain them for the next ten-year period (2021-2030, 2031-2040, etc.). In 
drafting these plans, member states are to consult with neighboring member states and with the public, 
taking their input into account. The Commission issues recommendations on the draft plans, and 
member states shall take ‘utmost account’ of these recommendations in their final NECPs – which are 
due one year after the drafts. Member states are invited to update their NECP once during the ten-year 
period (in 2023-2024), but only to reflect increased ambition. 
In the first year of implementation of the NECPs and every two years thereafter, member states 
submit integrated national energy and climate progress reports, again according to strict content 
guidelines. The Commission assesses these reports to evaluate the progress at the EU level towards 
the overarching Energy Union and 2030 goals, member state progress toward the implementation of 
their NECPs, and the overall impact of the aviation on the global climate.
9
 At this point, the 
                                                     
9
 The fact that the Commission includes aviation particularly in its biennial monitoring is related to the administrative 
streamlining the proposal aims to achieve. One of regulations to be repealed if this proposal passes is Regulation (EU) No 
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Commission can take a series of measures based on its assessment: issuing recommendations to a 
specific member state or to all member states; taking measures at the EU level; and requiring member 
states to take additional measures (in the case of renewables and energy efficiency) or to make a 
financial contribution to a financing platform (in the case of renewables). The specific circumstances 
in which each of these measures can be taken are explored in detail below. 
Some of the key dates and years laid out in the proposal are:  
 January 1, 2018 and 2019 – the dates for member states to submit their draft and final NECPs 
(for the 2021-2030 period), respectively.  
 March 15, 2021 – the due date for the first progress reports, and hence the first opportunity for 
Commission scrutiny of progress towards member states’ goals as stated in their NECPs.  
 January 1, 2023 and 2024 – the dates for member states to report their draft and final NECP 
updates, respectively, in case of increased ambition. 
 2023-2024 – a stocktaking moment for the energy efficiency and renewables targets, where 
additional measures can be taken at member state and EU level if necessary. 
 January 1, 2028 and 2029 – the dates for member states to submit their draft and final NECPs 
(for the 2031-2040 period), respectively.  
B) Planning: The Integrated National Energy and Climate Plans 
The integrated national energy and climate plans or NECPs are designed as the foundations in the 
implementation of the Energy Union. In a way, they are comparable to the (Intended) Nationally 
Determined Contributions ((I)NDCs)
10
 in the UNFCCC’s Paris process, in that they are plans designed 
and submitted by individual member states in fulfillment of a collective goal, in a bottom-up type 
process. However, the NECPs differ from the (I)NDCs in that they cover far more policy ground and 
in that the requirements in terms of their content and the procedure to develop them are more precisely 
defined. 
The process of developing the NECPs is depicted graphically below and described in detail in 
Annex 1. As is shown, the Commission has multiple occasions to intercede in case it finds that 
member states’ ambition is lacking during the planning phase, or if it finds inconsistencies between 
policies and measures. First, it may issue recommendations – of which the state must take the utmost 
account – on the member states’ draft plans. Second, when the final NECPs have been submitted, and 
in case the Commission finds that the collective effort of the NECPs will be insufficient to meet the 
Energy Union and 2030 objectives, it may “take measures at Union level”. The proposal contains no 
further description of these measures, effectively keeping the door open for a range of policy options. 
A third occasion for the Commission to provide input on member states’ planning is when states 
submit updates to their NECPs in 2023-2024.  
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
525/2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at 
national and Union level relevant to climate change (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2013). 
Assessing the non-CO2 impact of aviation on the global climate is part of that regulation. 
10
 These national plans were called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) until COP21 in Paris; once 
states ratify the Paris Agreement, the INDCs are converted into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). 
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Figure 1 NECP drafting process 
 
C) Reporting and Monitoring: Biennial Progress Reports and the Iterative Process 
The NECP drafting process provides the Commission with a first opportunity to address 
inconsistencies between the collective effort or ambition laid out in the NECPs and the EU-wide 
targets. However, it is from 2021 on, the first year of implementation of these plans, that the iterative 
process designed to avoid delivery gaps becomes more apparent. 
The main component here are the biennial progress reports which member states are to submit 
every two years starting on March 15, 2021. In these reports, member states describe, according to a 
binding template, their progress on the implementation of the NECPs and on the five dimensions of 
the Energy Union. The Commission uses these reports to comprehensively monitor both progress 
made by the member states towards their national plans and overall progress towards the Energy 
Union goals. The Commission also specifically tracks the evolution towards the 2030 renewables and 
energy efficiency targets. 
At this point, the Commission has a set of tools at its disposal in case it detects inconsistencies or 
insufficient progress towards the measures outlined in the NECPs and the five dimensions of the 
Energy Union. For the 2030 renewables and energy efficiency targets in particular, it has an additional 
set of tools. The specific focus on these two targets arguably relates to the need to stitch together their 
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nationally determined implementation and the fact that the target lies at the Union level. The 
Commission’s toolbox is depicted graphically below and described in more detail in Annex 2. 
Figure 2 The Commission’s toolbox in case of inconsistencies or insufficient progress towards 
targets 
 
i. The General Toolbox 
Issuing recommendations to a member state is the first in the set of general tools the Commission 
holds. It can choose to make recommendations if it observes either inconsistencies between policy 
developments in the member state and the overarching Energy Union objectives or insufficient 
progress toward what the member state laid out in its NECP.  
Second, if the Commission finds that there is insufficient progress toward the Energy Union and 
2030 targets and objectives at Union level (i.e., the Commission believes there is a risk the collective 
targets will not be met), it can use two tools. On the one hand, it may
11
 issue recommendations to all 
member states. On the other, it shall take, as appropriate, measures at the Union level (as mentioned 
above, this last provision is not explained further in the proposed regulation). 
ii. The Specific Toolbox for Renewables and Energy Efficiency 
In addition, there is a set of specific tools the Commission disposes of in case it detects gaps in the 
progress towards the 2030 renewables and energy efficiency targets. For renewables, there are two, 
rather more concrete options. First, if the Commission finds, based on the biennial progress reports, 
that a member state is not maintaining its own baseline share of renewables
12
 in its gross final 
consumption of energy, the member state will be asked to ensure any gap is covered by making a 
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 Note the use of the verb may here: the application of this measure is at the Commission’s discretion. 
12
 This baseline share is equal to the member state’s 2020 target, and is stipulated by the proposed directive on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (European Commission 2016h), another element of the Winter 
Package. Its proposed article 3(3) establishes the member states’ (then-nationally binding) 2020 renewables targets as a 
baseline in their progress towards the collective 2030 renewables target, from 2021 on. In other words, member states 
cannot go below their national 2020 targets from 2021 onwards. 
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financial contribution to the financing platform. The proposed regulation provides no further 
information on this financing platform, leaving decisions on its establishment and functioning for 
later, through delegated acts by the Commission. 
Second, 2023 is a review moment both for the renewables target and the energy efficiency target. 
If, in 2023, the Commission finds that the collective EU renewables target will likely not be met, 
member states shall ensure the emerging gap is covered through additional measures. These include: 
adjusting the share of renewables in the sectors of transport and/or heating and cooling; making a 
financial contribution to a financing platform set up at Union level; or other measures to increase the 
deployment of renewable energy. 
For the energy efficiency target, 2023 is also a review year, but here, it is the Commission that will 
take additional measures if the collective EU energy efficiency target is likely not to be met. These 
would be designed to improve the energy efficiency of (a) products, (b) buildings or (c) transport. 
iii. Assessing The Power Under The Hood 
To sum up, the Commission’s main tools in the governance proposal – for all aspects but greenhouse 
gas emissions, where additional measures are available (these are examined in the next section) – are: 
Union-level measures, recommendations to member states, and specific gap-closing measures for 
renewables and energy efficiency.  
Union-level measures are available in case of a gap in ambition or in the execution of plans. 
However, the governance proposal leaves the shape of these measures fully open (except in 2023, for 
the energy efficiency target). This leaves room to the imagination. Nevertheless, for these type of 
measures, political limitations will likely persist: implementing new Union-level measures would 
presumably require the ordinary legislative procedure and, hence, political (member state) consent. In 
other words, this hardly seems like a flexible tool in the Commission’s hands. 
Recommendations to a member state can be given at various moments: (a) in the process of 
finalization of the NECPs, (b) in case of inconsistencies between policy developments in a member 
state and the overarching Energy Union objectives, and (c) in case of insufficient progress towards 
what is laid out in a member state’s NECP. In subsequent progress reports, member states are to take 
these recommendations into the ‘utmost account’ and explain how they were addressed. If they deviate 
from the recommendations, they must explain why.  
The burning question remains: how effective will the recommendations be? On the one hand, 
previous experience with country-specific recommendations (CSRs) – in the European Semester – has 
not been particularly fruitful. According to Green Budget Europe (Adolf & Nix, 2016, p.5), which 
draws from a European Parliament briefing, none of the CSRs relating to climate energy and 
environment were fully implemented between 2012 and 2014. “Some progress” was made on 53% of 
the CSRs; none was made on 46%. Wyns, Khatchadourian & Oberthür argue that the focus of the 
European Semester was too economic, which limited its potential usefulness for energy and climate 
issues (2014, p.24). Moreover, the governance proposal under study in this paper does not explicitly 
contain a backstop in case recommendations are not implemented.
13
 This casts some doubt on their 
potential effectiveness; however in this kind of ‘soft governance’ system, much of course depends on 
the goodwill of member states.  
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 Duwe, Ohlendorf & Umpfenbach (2017, p.15) suggest that “a dedicated follow-up process should be foreseen to assess 
the actions reported by Member States” in order to evaluate whether these actions will truly suffice to remedy the 
problem addressed in the recommendation. In addition, they propose that in a second step, “an explicit implementation 
check regarding the reported actions and timetable should be installed.” Finally, on the consequences for non-delivery, 
they suggest that as a minimum, this issue could be discussed at the Council – as is the case under the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure. 
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On the other hand, Duwe et al. (2017, p.15) have pointed out that there could be a timing gap 
between when the Commission issues a recommendation and when the member state reports on its 
implementation. If the recommendation is issued shortly after a state has published its biennial 
progress report, that state will not have to report on the implementation of the recommendation until 
its next progress report, two years later. This does not exactly make for a very agile tool. 
The gap-closing measures for renewables and energy efficiency (in 2023) are more concrete, as are 
the measures in case a member state goes beneath its baseline share of renewables in its gross final 
energy consumption. One very concrete measure is requiring member states to adjust their renewables 
shares in specific sectors (a measure that was already hotly opposed by member states such as 
Romania and Hungary at the first Energy Council meeting on the Package in February 2017). Another 
is to require member states to make a contribution towards a financing platform for renewables. 
However, as the governance proposal contains little to no information on the financing platform that is 
to be set up, it is difficult to guess how effective this measure might be.  
While the full process calls for a far more detailed description, potential gap-closing measures will 
most likely first be discussed in the Climate Change Committee – or the future Energy Union 
Committee – which meets every 4-6 weeks and brings together all member states. The Climate 
Change Committee was created by Decision 280/2004/EC to deal with matters relating to greenhouse 
gas emissions and the Kyoto Protocol, while the forthcoming Energy Union Committee will deal with 
matters concerning energy efficiency and renewables. These Committees would typically seek a 
solution at the technical level. Ultimately, if no agreement is reached, matters would be decided in the 
Council. 
On the whole, the reporting and monitoring system described above is a result of a balancing game, 
driven by political and structural elements. It is strong on formal processes and procedures, but very 
much open-ended on substance – and particularly enforcement rules. The potential measures described 
here raise many effectiveness questions still, some of which may be clarified in part in the future 
legislative debates on this proposal. 
2.3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting and Monitoring 
The governance of the 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target differs from the other two in a 
number of respects. First, and most critically, this target has remained nationally binding.
14
 Second, 
the EU has a long track record and experience in monitoring and accounting for its emissions, built 
through its experience with the Kyoto Protocol, where a Union-level target was distributed among 
member states and monitored using a sophisticated and robust set of metrics, databases, and reporting 
(Delbeke & Vis, 2015, p.128). Third, the GHG target is closely linked to the commitments made by 
the EU and its member states under the UNFCCC process – particularly the reporting commitments 
related to the Paris Agreement. Fourth, a significant set of pre-existing legislation on these matters has 
been incorporated into the proposed governance regulation,
15
 a shift which is in line with the 
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 The binding commitment at the Union level is to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by the year 
2030 compared to 1990 levels. In order to put this into practice, efforts are made through both the ETS and the non-ETS 
sector. It is in this latter sector that nationally binding targets are set according to a formula related to per capita GDP in 
each member state. The economic effort of reaching the EU-wide emissions reduction target is thereby shared among 
member states according to their respective national situations. 
15
 For the 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction target, the related ‘governance’, or monitoring and reporting, was 
determined by an Effort Sharing Decision (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2009a) and the 
Climate Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2013). In 
the execution of the Energy Union strategy, and the transition to the 2030 targets, the Commission proposed in July 2016 
a new Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) (European Commission, 2016i), which amends the MMR. November 2016’s 
proposed Governance regulation, then, fully integrates the MMR, and repeals it from 1 January 2021 on (while retaining 
some transitional clauses).  
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regulation’s goals of streamlining and integrating existing regulation as well as integrating the energy 
and climate fields.  
Whereas almost all of the member states’ reporting requirements in the governance proposal are 
biennial, reporting on GHG emissions has both an annual and a biennial component. This is 
represented graphically in the figure below: 
Figure 3 GHG emissions planning and reporting 
 
A) Planning 
In terms of planning, the NECPs integrate required information on national GHG targets, LULUCF
16
 
commitments, and the current situation for GHG emissions and removals. In addition, in 2020 (and 
every ten years thereafter), member states are to report to the Commission their long-term low 
emissions strategies with a 50 years perspective
 17
 and make them available to the public. The timing 
of this delivery mirrors a Paris Agreement provision, which invites parties to the agreement to 
communicate their mid-century long-term GHG emission development strategies by the same year 
(2020).  
The long-term emissions strategies were previously outlined in the Climate Monitoring Mechanism 
Regulation (MMR), and are related to the EU’s goal of cutting its emissions to 80-95% below 1990 
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 Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
17
 These cover GHG reductions and the enhancement of removals by sinks and in individual sectors, expected progress on 
transitioning to a low GHG emissions economy, and links to other national long-term planning. They must also be 
consistent with the countries’ NECPs. 
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levels by 2050. Sartor, Donat & Umpfenbach (2017), however, find that in the current governance 
proposal, the level of detail on the strategies is weak – both regarding their required content and 
process. Moreover, they signal that given their 50 years perspective, these strategies, which would be 
written in 2020, would in fact extend until 2070 – a time horizon which makes it difficult to create 
credible objectives relevant to current policy. They also remark that the utility of the plans would drop 
significantly if they are published in 2020, as planned, two years after the draft NECPs. However, the 
virtue of long-term strategies is that they can provide insights and guidance for short-term policy 
setting and strategies.  
B) Reporting and Monitoring 
Reporting systems are expected to be ready by 2021, which is when member states commence 
reporting annually on GHG inventories for the previous year.
18
 Both member states and the 
Commission
19
 report to the UNFCCC on these GHG inventories, and the Commission uses the 
information to assess whether the Union and its member states have made sufficient progress (towards 
the Paris Agreement and UNFCCC’s overarching goals,20 the ESR, LULUCF provisions, and the 
relevant objectives of the NECP). Finally, member states also report biennially on GHG emissions – in 
this case, they report on the policies, measures and projections rather than on inventories. 
21
  
As discussed in the beginning of this section, the GHG target for 2030 differs from the others in 
that it has remained binding at the national level. What kind of actions, then, can be taken in case the 
member states do not reach their targets? This is laid out mainly in the proposed Effort Sharing 
Regulation (ESR): if the Commission finds that a member state is not making sufficient progress, a 
member state must first lay out an action plan to remedy the situation. The Commission can then (a) 
submit opinions on the Member State’s proposed action plan to remedy the situation, and (b) issue 
recommendations to the member states.  
Additional corrective measures are available in 2027 and 2032: in these years, member states are to 
provide inventory data prepared for their LULUCF accounts, and the Commission carries out a 
comprehensive review of national GHG inventory data. This is also the moment for the five-yearly 
compliance check
22
 on whether member states’ GHG emissions exceed their annual emission 
allocations for any of the five years in the period. If they do, the Commission can: (a) add tons of CO2 
to the member states’ emission figure of the following year according to a set formula and (b) 
temporarily prohibit member states from transferring their annual emissions allowances. (c) Finally, if 
a member state’s emissions over a five-year period exceed its removals, that excess amount will be 
deducted from its annual emissions allocations.
 23
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 The reporting is on approximated numbers in 2021 and 2022, and final numbers from 2023 on. 
19
 The Commission compiles approximated GHG inventories (in 2021 and 2022) and final GHG inventory reports (from 
2023 on), which are also sent to the UNFCCC Secretariat 
20
 For the Paris Agreement (2015), this is: holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels; increasing 
the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas 
emissions development; and making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate-resilient development. For the UNFCCC (United Nations, 1992), the chief aim is to “protect the climate system 
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.  
21
 The information to be submitted in this case is on national policies and measures regarding GHG emissions and on 
projections of GHG emissions by sources and removal by sinks (as opposed to the inventories, which member states 
report on annually). In addition, this information – as well as any relevant assessment of the costs and effects of the 
policies and measures described above – is made available to the public. 
22
 This provision is housed under the proposed ESR. 
23
 These measures are set out in ESR Art. 9(1)(a) and 9(2) (European Commission, 2016i). 
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The governance of the third 2030 target, on GHG emissions, thus has slightly more bite to it. On 
the one hand, remedial action plans, opinions and recommendations go one step further than simple 
recommendations, and require active member state participation without the time lag explained in the 
previous section. In 2027 and 2032, in addition, much clearer, corrective measures are available. It can 
thus be concluded, though more so via the ESR than through the proposed governance regulation, that 
the Commission does have more “sanctioning” power for the 2030 GHG target. 
2.4 State of the Energy Union Reports 
Based on the GHG reporting and the biennial progress reports (among other sources of information), 
the Commission publishes a yearly State of the Energy Union (SoEU) Report, of which two editions 
have already been produced. This report – which the Commission is to submit to the Parliament by 
October 31 of every year starting in 2021 – reflects the Commission’s assessment of the progress 
towards the overarching goals of (a) the Energy Union and 2030 framework; (b) the UNFCCC and the 
Paris Agreement; and (c) annual emission levels for the period from 2021 to 2030 (Effort Sharing 
Regulation) and the LULUCF regulation.
24
  
These public reports provide an opportunity for scrutiny of member state and EU progress on 
climate and energy matters, which could open the door for ‘naming and shaming’-type processes. 
However, the content of the reports will largely be determined by the absence or presence of 
consensus among member states, and this will ultimately determine their usefulness (Egenhofer, 
Marcu, Nuñez-Ferrer, Genoese & Elkerbout, 2015). In other words, the SoEU reports may 
complement the measures described in the previous section, by providing an extra, informal, pressure 
mechanism to advance the Union’s energy and climate targets. 
2.5 Linkages with the European Semester and the Paris Agreement 
For the 2020 targets, country progress on the renewables and energy efficiency targets was monitored 
in the European Semester (as described in part 2) and by the Vice Presidency on Economic Affairs. 
For 2030, the role of the European Semester changes and almost fades: the European Semester will 
switch
25
 to focusing on macro-economic and structural reform issues, while the governance regulation 
will address energy and climate-specific issues. The governance of the Energy Union and the 
European Semester are, then, clearly separate, though they are of course complementary (and 




The proposed governance mechanism bears some resemblance to the governance of the Paris 
Agreement, and the institutional design of both was indeed developed around the same time (Sartor, 
Colombier & Spencer, 2015). Similarly to what happens in the Paris process, European member states 
voluntarily report their intended commitments and the tools they plan to use to achieve them to the 
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 The report’s required content is outlined in detail in Article 29(2) of the proposed governance regulation. 
25
 This is already somewhat underway, and Green Budget Europe (Adolf & Nix, 2016) has, in this respect, drawn attention 
an emerging ‘governance gap’ between 2015 and 2020, since climate and energy-specific recommendations are being 
omitted from the European Semester from 2015 on and the new governance will not kick in until 2020. They point out 
that the only available governance options, then, lie in “full-blown legal action under Directives/Regulations.” 
26
 Even though energy and climate issues are to fall under the Energy Union’s Governance Regulation, “where energy and 
climate specific policy issues are relevant for macroeconomic or structural reforms, they could still be addressed by the 
Country Specific Recommendations in the European Semester process” (European Commission 2016f). In addition, 
member states are to take the country-specific recommendations of the European Semester into account when preparing 
their NECPs and updates. The Commission is asked to take these same recommendations into account when assessing 
progress towards the Energy Union. It should also ensure any recommendations issued under the Governance proposal 
are complementary to the recommendations issued in the context of the European Semester. 
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Commission, and the expectation is that their intentions and actions will add up to the collective result 
necessary to achieve primarily Union-level goals – particularly on renewables and energy efficiency. 
Unlike the Paris Agreement however, the Commission has set out a clear, detailed and extensive 
template for the initial reporting requirements in its governance proposal; it also has more tools at its 
disposal to address gaps and inconsistencies.  
In terms of their chronology, the Paris Agreement (PA) is also clearly interlinked with the 
governance proposal, logically so given the climate-energy integration that the Commission is striving 
for in the Energy Union architecture. First, in planning, the Paris process includes a facilitative 
stocktaking moment in 2018 to review collective efforts towards the long-term PA goal. In the 
governance proposal, the deadline for draft NECPs notably falls in the same year. In addition, member 
states are meant to finalize their NECPs by 2019 – just on time for submitting new or updated NDCs 
to the Paris Agreement (in 2020), which they could potentially adapt based on their interpretation of 
the outcomes of 2018 Paris facilitative stocktaking moment. The same occurs with the updating cycle 




Second, the parties to the Paris Agreement are invited to communicate their mid-century long-term 
GHG emission development strategies by 2020. The Commission calls for member states to publish 
their long-term emissions strategies with a fifty-year perspective by 1 January 2020. However, as 
pointed out above, the latter plans will reach to 2070 rather than 2050, possibly affecting their level of 
concretion and their effectiveness as a policy-planning tool. 
Third, regarding reporting, the Energy Union’s GHG inventory reporting provisions in particular 
are geared towards UNFCCC requirements. Member states’ reporting to the UNFCCC is integrated 
into the reporting for the governance proposal. In 2027, for example, the Commission 
comprehensively reviews national GHG inventory data, just on time to inform the PA’s global 
stocktake in 2028. Finally, in its monitoring, the Commission consistently checks progress against the 
UNFCCC and PA’s overarching goals.  
3. Key Political Issues & Positioning of States 
The proposed governance regulation and the Winter Package it is part of are now beginning to make 
their way through the legislative process and past the European Parliament and Council. This process 
may yet lead to substantial modifications.  
The new 2030 energy and climate framework, adopted in 2014, was already the product of a 
political bargaining process. Claude Turmes (2017, pp.204-7) in fact argues that the European Council 
overstepped its mandate when deciding on this framework, by deciding on concrete numbers and 
bindingness for the 2030 targets in this organ (where unanimity rules, and countries therefore have de 
facto vetoes) rather than in the Council of Ministers (where the qualified majority rule could have 
overruled some member state preferences).  
While member states such as Germany, France, Italy and the Scandinavian countries were in favor 
of maintaining nationally binding targets of the 2020 framework, others were against, including the 
UK and many Eastern European states. Those against argued that policies would be much more cost-
effective without the strict corset of nationally binding targets (Delbeke et al., 2015, p.87). The UK, 
for example, sought flexibility in achieving the EU’s energy and climate targets and found that 
nationally binding targets were a barrier. In Germany, on the other hand, the Energiewende was in full 
swing, and the push towards renewables strong. Meanwhile, the critical COP21 climate change 
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 Duwe et al. (2017, p.12) argue that the timing for the NECP updates is not well aligned. A global stocktake is to take 
place under the Paris process in 2023, and the authors argue that the draft NECP updates should therefore be due after the 
stocktake (i.e., in 2024) in order to be able to incorporate the Paris process stocktake information. 
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negotiations were approaching rapidly, and France’s presidency of the UNFCCC conference presented 
an opportunity for both Paris and Brussels to shine in one of the EU’s favored international areas, 
climate change. To ensure its credibility, however, the EU needed to present an ambitious package at 
home prior to the conference. 
In the end, the 2030 target for greenhouse gas emissions remained nationally binding. For 
renewables and energy efficiency, however, the targets were shifted up a level: goals were set at the 
EU level, with the execution left up to the member states through their voluntary plans and actions. 
Member states who had fought for nationally binding targets and lost consequently sought a robust 
and reliable governance system to compensate for their loss. Governance was to be critical to bridge 
the gap between the Union-level targets and national execution, and the governance regulation in the 
Winter Package reveals the proposed blueprint for that bridge. Its strength will now ultimately be 
defined by the outcome of the upcoming political and legislative discussions – and some member state 
representatives interviewed for this paper have already signaled that the governance proposal may well 
be the most discussed in the entire Winter Package. 
In the Council, talks have commenced on the Winter Package under the Maltese presidency, which 
has stated it is particularly focused on getting a deal on energy efficiency. Malta is also aware of the 
concerns on the tight timelines for the package negotiations, and is attempting to take those worries on 
board. Meanwhile, in the European Parliament’s ITRE (Industry, Research and Energy) Committee, 
an experienced rapporteur from the Greens (C. Turmes) has been chosen to head up discussions on the 
governance portion of the package. 
A first point is that there is member state pushback on timing. On the one hand, and for the full 
package, the Commission has stated its ambition for 2017 to be the year of implementation for the 
Energy Union.
28
 However, February’s meeting of the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
Council revealed doubts among a large number of member states (including the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Latvia, France, the Netherlands and others) on whether it would be possible to approve all of 
the legislative and non-legislative measures in the package by the end of the year. The Parliament, 
meanwhile, has committed to finalizing its positions by November 2017 (Council of the European 
Union, 2017c). Given the size of the package, it is likely that the deadline for approving all of its 
elements may be pushed back somewhat.  
On the other hand, in its governance proposal, the Commission set a January 1, 2018 deadline for 
member states to submit their draft NECPs, and established January 1, 2019 as the deadline for the 
finalized plans. The Commission itself has noted that it will be difficult to meet these targets, and 
member states reiterated this at the February 2017 Energy Council meeting.
 29
 More importantly, there 
may be resistance not just to the timeline for the NECPs, but to the substance and level of detail they 
require.  
Keay & Buchan, for example, pointed out that there was a risk of revolt related to these plans and 
the Commission’s drive for them. Writing in November 2015, they explained that two-thirds of the 
member states had no long-term plans of this sort. The one-third that did, they added, already had 
sophisticated planning procedures of their own, and no appetite for additional and differently defined 
requirements from Brussels in this matter (pp.4-5).
30
 Given the complexity of the NECPs, a number of 
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 This ambition that was repeated by the three presidents (of the European Parliament, Council and Commission) in their 
joint declaration on the legislative priorities for 2017 (European Commission, 2016e). 
29
 Many member states point out that the Energy Council conclusions of November 2015 (European Council, 2015) called 
for the NECPs to be finalized by the end of 2019 rather than the beginning of the year. 
30
 The impact assessment (European Commission, 2016d) carried out in the context of the proposed governance regulation 
revealed that 52% of stakeholders that replied to the consultation were in favor of maintaining a high level of detail in 
future planning instruments; however four member states openly expressed their preference for short strategic planning 
documents with a high level of aggregation (15 member states contributed to the public consultation, which took place 
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member states have already requested technical support in preparing the NECPs, which the 
Commission appears prepared to supply. Both the deadlines and the templates for the NECPs, 
therefore, stand to face discussion. 
Another critical point may be a provision which is tucked away in the governance proposal in a 
seemingly innocuous fashion: in 2020 (and every ten years thereafter), member states are to report to 
the Commission their long-term low emissions strategies with a 50 years perspective, which they must 
then make available to the public. However, writing and publishing these strategies in 2020 may force 
member states to reveal discrepancies between their mid-term (the NECPs for 2021-2030, submitted in 
2018-9) and long-term (50-years perspective) strategies (Fischer, 2017). Hence, certain member states 
may attempt to modify this provision or at least push its delivery back. Postponing the publication of 
the long-term strategy would moreover allow member states to keep the window of opportunity for 
investments in certain energy technologies open longer. Postponing it would, however, also break the 
synchronization with the Paris Agreement’s requirements and possibly endanger progress towards the 
long-term decarbonization goal.  
At the February 2017 Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council, a number of member 
states including Croatia and Slovakia requested more clarity from the Commission on the financing 
platform that is proposed as a gap-filling measure if (a) the EU is not on track to meet its collective 
27% renewables goal or (b) a member state falls below its renewables baseline (which is set at the 
level of its 2020 target). As mentioned above, there is indeed very little detail in the proposal on how 
this financing platform (which was, according to Claude Turmes (2017, p.161), proposed by France 
and Germany in the spring of 2016) would function – and as one member state representative has said, 
“it’s all about the what if.” Some (Fischer, 2017, p.3) have suggested that this platform may be “the 
Commission’s attempt to create the nucleus of its own EU renewables support scheme”, and logically, 




It is important to note the many connections between the governance proposal and other 
components of the Winter Package and the Energy Union legislation. At the February 2017 Council 
meeting, member states commented that “the examination of the [governance] proposal should be 
coordinated with the examination of the rest of the package, due to its many links with the other 
proposals of the Clean Energy package” (Council of the European Union 2017a). Indeed, in the course 
of the research for this paper, interviewees indicated that member states were likely to use issue 
linkages across various components of the full package in order to play to their own interests.  
On the whole, and returning to the initial divergence between member states on the 2030 
framework, the dividing lines on governance will probably mimic the map of positions in 2014.
32
 
Germany is likely to support the proposals for the most part, along with the Scandinavian countries 
and perhaps France
33
 or Italy as well. Countries such as Poland and the rest of the Visegrád 4 will 
struggle against many provisions, and extra incentives may be necessary to shift their positions closer 
to those in the package and its governance section.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
from January to April 2016: Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden). 
31
 Slovakia, for example, explained at the Energy Council that it had reservations on creating new sources of financing at 
EU level and current form in which it was proposed. 
32
 In other elements of the Winter Package, this has already become clear: the proposed changes to the 2030 energy 
efficiency target (shifting it from 27% to 30% and making it binding rather than indicative at the EU level), for example, 
caused a stir in the first Council meeting on the package, with states such as the Czech Republic, Latvia and Hungary 
arguing against the shift (Council of the European Union 2017, 2017b) 
33
 France notably mirrored the UK during the February 2017 Energy Council in saying the Energy Union governance must 
not become a straightjacket, but should ensure flexibility (Council of the European Union, 2017b). 
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The level of eastern European support – particularly from Warsaw – may be in part determined by 
what assurances are provided on energy security (which was the main focus of Tusk’s original Energy 
Union proposal), particularly in relation to Russia. Measures on energy poverty may also be linked 
into the discussions in order to make headway. These incentives may, for example, take the shape of 
“some extra financial grease”, i.e. extra help for coal and carbon-intensive industrial regions (Buchan 
& Keay, 2016a, p.9).  
The Visegrád 4 indeed spoke in unison at the first Council meeting on the Winter Package, with a 
joint statement. However, it is important to remark that the four may not be perfectly aligned on all 
matters: Poland and Hungary are more vocal in their disagreement than the more progressive Czech 
Republic and Slovakia; Czech Republic and Hungary are better positioned for a low-carbon transition; 
and all four differ in terms of energy poverty and CO2 emissions (Dufour, 2017). 
We cannot state with any certainty what position France, one of the original architects and 
defenders of the governance system, will take at this point. The new government and parliament that 
are to take office after the elections this spring will be decisive in this respect. Spain, meanwhile, has 
underscored its need for energy interconnections with the rest of the continent, and also called for 
additional flexibility due to its situation as an energy island. Finally, Brexit may change the map of 
positions somewhat: the UK’s traditional push for a light-touch governance system may lose some 
impact, with the country set to leave the EU before the governance provisions come into force.  
Lastly, while the UK itself may not be a central actor in the legislative debate regarding this 
package, Brexit will impact the European energy landscape and probably the negotiations on the 
Energy Union’s governance. For one, the UK’s contribution to the EU budget may be sorely missed in 
case extra incentives are needed to pass this package, particularly in Poland. As Pye, Mathieu & 
Deane (2017) explain in their stocktaking of research on the climate and energy effects of Brexit, there 
are a number of other possible effects of London’s withdrawal. First, Brexit will leave a hole in the EU 
ETS, and may further harm the system. Second, despite its recent push to remove the nationally 
binding renewable targets for 2030, the UK has traditionally been considered a forerunner in both 
climate policy and the liberalization of energy markets – the push London has provided in these 
matters may be missed in Brussels. Finally, there are doubts on whether the EU can meet its third 2030 
GHG target (of reducing its emissions by 40%) without the UK, whose progress in mitigation has been 
higher than EU average and whose departure would leave the 27 remaining member states to pick up 
the extra burden. 
4. Conclusions 
The unique and idiosyncratic governance of the Energy Union is, to a large degree, a response to 
the 2030 renewables and energy efficiency targets which are not nationally binding. Member 
states who had fought for nationally binding targets and lost – Germany, France, Italy and the 
Scandinavian countries – now seek a robust and reliable governance system to bridge the gap between 
the Union-level targets and their national execution. 
In this way, the proposed governance model resembles the design of the Paris Agreement 
mechanisms to some degree: in a bottom-up process, member states are to submit their national 
energy and climate plans, and the sum of these must then add up to the collective goal. A key 
difference with Paris is that the Energy Union governance will require states to report on their plans 
through detailed templates, and that the Commission can take measures (some stronger than others) in 
case it sees the collective goal will not be met. 
Another divergence with the Paris Agreement is that the Energy Union governance model 
does not foresee any ratcheting up of targets. There are some safeguards against backsliding on 
ambition – if member states choose to update their NECPs, they can only do this to reflect increased 
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ambition; and for renewables, the 2020 targets are established as the baseline or floor – but no 
particular provisions for ratcheting up targets.
34
  
The EU’s long-standing experience in monitoring and accounting of greenhouse gas emissions 
– both its Union-wide target and national targets – has shown the importance of solid monitoring 
and reporting systems for policymaking cycles. This two-level experience – and that of member states 
such as Germany, which also have mature systems in this regard – will be helpful in furthering the 
Energy Union governance. 
Despite some clear corrective measures for the greenhouse gas emissions target, many of the 
Commission’s tools to address gaps remain in the realm of soft governance, which relies, to a 
large degree, on reputational mechanisms. It remains to be seen whether the additional transparency 
proposed in the governance proposal and the created potential for naming and shaming will be 
effective. Given that there are very few coercive measures foreseen in the proposal, the goodwill of the 
member states will be necessary for quite a number of the provisions to work. 
More clarity is needed regarding some aspects of the system. How precisely should member 
states execute regional consultations when elaborating their NECPs? What would happen if a member 
state repeatedly fails to implement its plans and address the Commission’s recommendations? (There 
is currently no backstop in this case.) What shape might the new financing platform for renewables 
take, and how would member states contributions to it be calculated? What kind of additional Union-
level measures might the Commission adopt if the EU as a whole is not delivering?  
Weakening of the proposed governance system may come mainly in the shape of member 
states pushing back on timing. First, many doubt it is possible to approve all of the legislative and 
non-legislative measures in the Winter Package by the end of 2017. Second, reservations are also 
widespread that member states will submit their draft and finalized NECPs by the January 1, 2018 and 
the January 1, 2019 deadlines, respectively. Third, certain member states may push back against 
reporting on their long-term low emissions strategies by 2020, as doing so may force them to reveal 
discrepancies between their short-term (NECPs) and long-term strategies. 
Additionally, the planning templates stand to face discussion. Given the level of detail required 
in the NECPs, a number of member states have already requested technical support in when preparing 
them. The Commission appears prepared to supply this assistance. 
The governance proposal is an inextricable part of the broader Winter Package, and issue linkages 
during the legislative process are likely. Member states have indicated the importance of the 
governance proposal and signaled it would be hotly debated; they are likely to link to issues in other 
parts of the Energy Union legislation in doing so. 
Based on this initial assessment of a seemingly technical but in fact highly political regulation, it 
will be critical to follow the evolution of this novel proposal through the legislative procedure.  
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Annex 1. The NECP Drafting Process 
The National Climate and Energy Plans (NECPs) are to be drawn up every ten years, with the first 
draft NCEP due on January 1, 2018 for all member states [Art. 9(1)]. In formulating the draft NECPs, 
the Commission stipulates that Member States shall ensure early and effective opportunities for the 
public to participate in the preparation [Art. 10]. In keeping with a line that appears in other parts of 
the Winter Package, the Commission also specifies that member states should engage with other 
member states, particularly neighbors. Member states should (a) identify opportunities for regional 
cooperation in the draft plan, and (b) consult neighboring and other member states well before 
submitting the draft (including, where applicable, how their comments have been taken into account) 
[Art. 11(2)]. The Commission also commits to facilitating this process of consulting and cooperation 
between member states, in the transition from draft to final plans [Art. 11(3)].  
Below is a graphic representation of the drafting process for the NECPs: 
Figure 4 NECP drafting process 
 
As is shown, once the draft NECP is submitted to the Commission, the Commission may issue 
recommendations to the member state, regarding (a) the level of ambition of the objectives (in view of 
the collective EU 2030 targets and particularly those related to renewables and energy efficiency), (b) 
the policies and measures related to this ambition and other policies of cross-border relevance, and (c) 
interactions and consistency between policies and measures (both existing and planned) [Art. 9(2)]. 
The member state then must take the “utmost account” of these Commission recommendations when 
Marie Vandendriessche, Angel Saz-Carranza and Jean-Michel Glachant 
26 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
finalizing its NECP [Art. 9(3), 28(2a)], while also taking into consideration the comments of other 
member states [Art. 11(4)] (and explaining in its final NECP how it did so). 
When the final NECPs have been submitted, in 2019, the Commission assesses the plans [Art. 12]. 
If it finds that the member states’ targets, objectives and contributions will be collectively insufficient 
to meet the Energy Union and 2030 objectives, the Commission will take “measures at Union level” to 
ensure their achievement [Art. 27(1)].  
In 2023-2024, member states may choose to update their NECPs, but – importantly – they can only 
modify them to reflect increased ambition [Art. 13(1)].
35
 The update process works similarly to the 
original draft and final NECP process [Art. 13(6)], and includes regional cooperation/consultation and 
a process of Commission recommendations on the draft and final updates (but not, explicitly at least, 
public consultation on the draft update).
36
 Here again, if the Commission finds that the targets and 
contributions in the final NECP updates will not add up to enough to meet the collective Energy Union 
objectives and 2030 targets, it will take measures at the Union level [Art. 27(1)].  
Annex 2. Biennial Progress Reports and the Iterative Process 
A) Biennial Progress Reports 
Every two years, starting on March 15, 2021, member states are to submit a report to the Commission 
on the state of implementation of the NECPs [Art. 15]. These ‘integrated national energy and climate 
progress reports’ must include a detailed set of information on progress toward, or the state of, (a) the 
five dimensions of the Energy Union, (b) projections of GHG emissions by source and removals by 
sinks and related policies and measures, (c) national adaptation planning and actions in the context of 
climate change, and (d) a set of other data [Art. 16-22].
37
  
Over the course of the subsequent eight months (by October 31, 2021 and every two years 
thereafter), the Commission comprehensively monitors the Progress Reports and other statistics in 
order to assess (a) the progress made toward the Energy Union and 2030 targets and objectives, (b) the 
member states’ progress toward what they set out in their NECPs, and (c) the overall impact of 
aviation on the global climate [Art. 25(1)]. This assessment also includes specific monitoring of 
renewables and energy efficiency targets [Art. 25(2-3)]. 
B) Measures in Case of Inconsistencies or Insufficient Progress 
In case the Commission detects inconsistencies or insufficient progress at member state or Union 
level, it has a number of options, depicted graphically below. 
                                                     
35
 Some stakeholders have questioned the fact that NECPs can only be updated for increased ambition: they worry that 
other circumstances might also warrant an update, for example if the cost of the policies outlines in the NECP 
unexpectedly balloons out of control. 
36
 The NEPC update procedure also provides for mitigation of potential adverse environmental effects of the policies that 
are being carried out: “Member States shall make efforts to mitigate in the updated plan any adverse environmental 
impacts that become apparent as part of the integrated reporting pursuant to Articles 15 to 22.” [Art. 13(4)].  
37
 Specifically, this last category includes: copies of biennial reports and national communications submitted to the 
UNFCCC secretariat; as appropriate, estimates on improved air quality and emission reductions of air pollutants and 
other benefits of specific energy efficiency; and the annual reporting requirements contained in the package, which 
include: data on support to developing countries in the context of climate change, the use of revenues by auctioning 
greenhouse gas emissions allowances, greenhouse gas inventories, the state of emergency crude oil stocks (as per Article 
6(2) of Directive 2009/119/EC), and data on offshore oil and gas operations (as per Annex IX, point 3, of Directive 
2013/30/EU). 
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Figure 5 The Commission’s toolbox in case of inconsistencies or insufficient progress (detailed) 
 
The procedures are the following: 
 If, in its assessment of member states’ biennial or annual reporting, the Commission identifies 
inconsistencies between policy developments in the member state and the overarching Energy 
Union objectives, the Commission shall issue recommendations to that member state. [Art. 
26(1)] 
 If, based on the biennial progress reports, a member state is making insufficient progress toward 
what it laid out in its NECP, the Commission shall issue recommendations to that member state. 
[Art. 27(2)] 
 If, based on the biennial progress reports and other information sources, the Commission detects 
that there is insufficient progress towards Energy Union and 2030 objectives and targets at 
Union level – i.e. if it finds that there is a risk that these targets will not be met, (a) the 
Commission may issue recommendations to all member states to mitigate this risk; and (b) in 
addition, the Commission shall take, as appropriate, measures at the Union level, in particular in 
the case of the renewables and energy efficiency targets. [Art. 27(3)] 
In all cases where a member state receives a recommendation, the member state shall (a) take utmost 
account of these recommendations [Art 28(2a)], and (b) in its next Progress Report, it shall set out the 
policies and measures adopted, or the plans for implementation, with a detailed timetable, and 
justifications if it deviates from the recommendation [Art. 28(2b)]. 
C) Specific Measures Related to Renewables and Energy Efficiency 
For renewables, it is important to note that the proposed directive on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources (European Commission, 2016h) – another element of the Winter 
Package, which recasts Directive 2009/28/EC (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union, 2009b) – sets a clear baseline for the member states’ 2030 renewables target. The proposed 
article 3(3) establishes the member states’ (then-nationally binding) 2020 renewables targets as a 
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baseline. In other words, member states cannot go below their national 2020 targets from 2021 
onwards. 
For both the renewables and efficiency target, there is clearly a special focus in monitoring 
(described in Annex 1). In addition, in the year 2023-2024 (the same year in which member states can 
submit an update to their NECPs if they aim to increase their ambition), a number of specific measures 
are foreseen for renewables and energy efficiency. These are represented graphically below: 
Figure 6 The Commission’s specific toolbox for the renewables and energy efficiency 
targets(detailed) 
 
The procedures are the following: 
 If, in the year 2023 and based on the biennial progress reports, the Commission assesses that the 
collective EU renewables target is likely not to be met, the member states shall ensure by the 
year 2024 that any emerging gap is covered by additional measures, such as: adjusting the share 
of renewables in the sectors of (a) heating and cooling and (b) transport, (c) making a financial 
contribution (for which member states may use their revenues from annual emission allowances) 
to a financing platform set up at Union level, contributing to renewable energy projects and 
managed directly or indirectly by the Commission, or (d) other measures. [Art. 27(4)] 
 If, in the year 2023 and based on the biennial progress reports, the Commission assesses that the 
collective EU energy efficiency target is likely not to be met, the Commission will take 
additional measures by the year 2024, to improve the energy efficiency of (a) products, (b) 
buildings or (c) transport. [Art. 27(5)] 
 In addition, and starting in 2021, if the Commission finds based on the biennial progress reports 
that a member state is not maintaining its baseline share of renewables
38
 in its gross final 
consumption of energy, that member state shall ensure any gap is covered by making a financial 
                                                     
38
 i.e., the share described in its 2020 target, see above. 
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contribution to the financing platform mentioned above. Again, it can use its revenues from 
annual emissions allowances to do so. [Art. 27(4)] 
  
Marie Vandendriessche, Angel Saz-Carranza and Jean-Michel Glachant 
30 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Author contacts: 
 
Esade, Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics 





Angel Saz-Carranza  
Esade, Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics 






Florence School of Regulation 
RSCAS, European University Institute  
Casale, Via Boccaccio, 121 
I-50133 Florence 
Italy 
Email: Jean-Michel.Glachant@eui.eu 
 
 
 
